Situation in Donbass by August 14
Briefly about the situation on the front lines.
1. Nobody is storming Luhansk. There is low-intensity shelling, and their intensity actually lowered somewhat. In the pre-field low-intensity military action continued, which is mostly related to shelling and the activity of the reconnaissance and sabotage groups of both side. The rumors about a "coup" in Luhansk are not confirmed for now.
2. From the surrounded group a reinforced armor group rushed yesterday and cut the road to Krasnodon. Fighting with the goal of pushing it away continue there. This strike was clearly unexpected for the local command, the slow reaction stems from this. According to the sources, sweeping the road will take 1-2 days.
3. Humanitarian cargo systemically passes through a wide hole in the border. Where the "white convoy" will go is not clearly known yet. Izvarino is mentioned increasingly more often, but considering the political subtext of this action everything may change there many times.
4. On the territory of the former South cauldron at this moment there is are no junta soldiers left – there may be some straggling squads left, but no systemic resistance remains already. The overall number of captured vehicles (of varying condition) reaches 80-90.
Approximately the same number is destroyed or otherwise put out of order.
1. An attempt to surround Gorlovka and break to Yenakiyevo at this time is unsuccessful. The advancing military got stuck in the defensive lines of the militia. The militia is keeping control over the key road that connects Donetsk and Gorlovka. Nevertheless the enemy is not abandoning hopes of carrying out a strike on convergent directions and cutting off Gorlovka from Donetsk. To achieve these goals they are pulling additional MRLS systems and tubed artillery to the location of fighting.
2. The offensive on Ilovaysk apparently ran out of steam and currently the forces are regrouped for to resume it ASAP. Once again it was subjectively proved that during the assault of those settlements where the militia have sufficiently many forces, the junta typically fails. So it is even more strange that instead of the attempts to bypass and surround Ilovaysk the junta with stubbornness worthy of a better cause tries to capture it head-on.
3. Yesterday the information appeared that the militia took back Debaltsevo. As far as I know the reconnaissance and sabotage groups of Mozgovoi are actively engaged in the direction of Debaltsevo and reached the outskirts of the city. There is no speaking of complete capture of Debaltsevo. Mozgovoi carries out disturbing action, forcing the junta to take forces off other direction in order to parry this unpleasant activity.
Of course, this fighting impedes using Debaltsevo for offensive operations to full extent.
4. Torez, Shakhtyorsk, Snezhnoye, and Miusinsk are held by the militia, here the junta was pulled into low-perspective fighting, in which the strike capabilities of mechanized detachments are spent, to put it mildly, not in the best way. The positional nature of fighting allows the militia to use their artillery effectively and inflict losses on the junta military, which due to the nature of fighting, end up in self-styled "cauldrons" about which the militia constantly reports, but which the militia cannot destroy due to lack of forces, because these encirclements are performed by forces that are insufficient for this. Here it is even possible to say not that the militia is surrounding but that first the junta beats a corridor with its tanks, pulls into it, and then this corridor gets cut and a cauldron emerges, which is not very robust, because while the armor group remains mobile, it can always penetrate it on a number of directions (e.g., the Luhansk airport).
5. Yasinovataya continues to be subjects to massive shelling, but the attempts to enter the city end up being unsuccessful for the junta, because shelling has mostly terrorist nature and doesn't touch the military infrastructure of the DPR. The same thing happens with shelling of Donetsk too. Homes are destroyed, civilians die, social infrastructure crumbles, but despite the overall systemic nature of such actions (read war crimes), the military potential of the DPR effectively doesn't suffer.
6. Krasnyi Luch was held, a part of roads was swept, so now we can confidently state that the plan of wide encirclement of Donetsk and Gorlovka failed for the second time – first under Shakhtyorsk, second time under Krasnyi Luch. Judging from the activity under Gorlovka and Yasinovataya, the bet is again made on the close wrap of the capital of the DPR.
Overall, the militia is holding on to crucial points and the junta offensive is not developing as rapidly as fascists would have it. Significant losses and low speed of advancing is clearly not something that will allow to achieve victory by August 24. Nevertheless the operative risks for the DPR are very serious. All reserves were deployed into action and there is no complete guarantee that with the increase of a push the enemy won't be able to achieve a major success on at least one direction. The situation with a breakthrough from Luhansk airport once again proves that the militia command is not always able to react to enemy plans in a timely fashion.
04-svodka-voennyh-sobytiy-v-novorossii-z a-13082014.html (in Russian) – military action in Novorossia, 08/13
01-voyna-na-yugo-vostoke-onlayn-14082014-h ronika-sobytiy-post-obnovlyaetsya.html – online broadcast on the "Voice of Sevastopol" for 08/14
77-voyna-na-yugo-vostoke-onlayn-13082014-h ronika-sobytiy-post-obnovlyaetsya.html – online broadcast on the "Voice of Sevastopol" for 08/13
Original article: http://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/172
9295.html (in Russian)